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Existence and Ur,:queness of Equilibrium 
Points  for Coricave %-Person Sames 
by 
A constrained n-person gam i s  consldered i n  which the  cons t ra in ts  
:'or erc'r, p;ayer, as wel l  as i i l s  ;?ayoff function, may depend on t'ne 
t L a  "c&- of every p h y e r  . 
a game i s  shown. 
Yne existence of an equilibrium  pol;?^ f o r  
By requiring appropriate concavity i n  tke  payoff 
- _ m c , l a ~ s  a concave game i s  der'Lned. 
E:quillbrlum point f o r  every s;r:ctbJ concave game. A dynamic model for 
zonec--<lllbriuq s l tua t ions  i s  propose&. This mowi  cons is t s  of s system 
It i s  proved t h a t  there  i s  a unique 
--- 
.- , layer 's  s t ra tegy.  
systen I s  globally asp,pto;lcally s t z 3 l e  with respec t  t o  the  m1que 
It i s  c 3 c x  xhat f o r  a s t r i c t l y  concave gar:.? the  
& 
e quilibrium point 02 tlie gme . 7 7  s i n a l l y ,  it i s  shown how a gradient 
xeYiio2 su i t ab le  for a concave r a t h e m t i c a l  programming 
-set to f lnd  t'ne equi l ibr iun  -point for a concave game. 
1 
problem can 3s 
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-.. 0 ::as> --O, -13 and <le existence o? suck points  proved under cer ta ln  s;surz?-,ions 
on eac';? piayer s s t ra tegy  space and corresponding payofl  function. He shaved 
;htc :I each player is r e s t r i c t e d  t o  a sim?lex i n  h i s  own s t ra tegy  spsce and If 
?3::-; Z X i s t s .  
zrL6 1ejl-e-i: L1.j and XcKenzie 191, -.,-her? each p layer ' s  s t ra tegy  space r ay  de2end 
T Z i s  r e s u l t  has Seer, genersllzed t o  an abs t r ac t  ecor,om;i by Arrow 
-- . 
3 --ALs c-7 ?*ore gerierai problem i s  cocsidered here.  Spec i f ica l ly ,  it I s  only 
- - = - - - -  Lc;,;L u ed ",tit every :oin'; strategy, represented by a point  i n  the  prozuct space 
c l  ;;:e in&%vl5aai strategy spaces, l i e  i n  a cowex, closed and bounded reglon 
3 
uc 33'rcave I n  h i s  owx strategy. 
I 2  :he p o d u c t  space and t h a t  each p l aye r ' s  payoff P a c t i o n  vi, 1 = 1, n, 
R e  existence of an equilibrium poiz: f o r  t h i s  
C~:,CZVE: n-Terson gane is  show- i n  T'neorem 1, using a rapping of R i x t o  3 
z c  ::.e &di tan i  l i xed  point  theorem [4]. 
*-% 
,+ * - .  
Gze of t h e  d E f i c u l t i e s  which has lirril-ced t h e  usei%lness of tr,e zoncept of 
%T ? q - ~ % l L k i x x  point  for  an n-person game i s  the lack  of uniqueness of such 
7"- yu,,A,us, *- as skowr, by the f a c t  thaz r a y . ~  gazies possess an i n f i n i t e  number of 
3 
eqLiii3riLT poin ts  ( fo r  example, see Shapley [ U ] ) .  This d i f f i c u l t y  i s  overcome 
Sy YeGGiring t h a t  tine payoff functions satisfy an add i t iona l  concavity re- 
c ? h I r p - z  . , a ~ n t  which i s  ca l led  diagonzl s t r i c t  concavity. With t h i s  addlzional  .,. 
re;u:yenerx 1: 1s skown i n  'Zneorems 2, 3 and 4 t h a t  every concave n-persor, 
- ?,as a -a:qce eq-dl ibr iur i  p o l x .  Theorem 2 shows uniqueness f o r  a game 
. -  ,--- Y , -  .. rn x thogoza l  constraint  se t s ,  t ha t  i s ,  where R i s  t h e  d i r e c t  product of 
- ,,,e F I c d i v l h a ;  p layer ' s  s t r a t egy  spaces. I n  Theorems 3 the  more general  case of 
- 2  - 
* .  - - 
-.- ~ - 
L L  A,--s~ e c ~ s t r a i n t s  i s  cozsidere: e 
LA +LA.,s 0;' a specif ied pos l t ive  c x s t a c t  
LIAL valLie of the $ial v a r i a 5 k s  for ;he 1- player. 
I -x:cde r,ornalized equili l jr iux p)irx 
parazeters  r .  
?zicz:~n (2; w l t h  respect  t o  r_. I s  sho~m i n  Theorem 5 .  Section 3 i s  
co:-.?lel;ete? by givizg a sui*ficien: c ~ z 3 . t i o f i  f o r  diagonal s t r i c t  corxavity i n  
-c-...> of c e r a i n  Zess ian  rratrices o: the 
S. no:-.nal;ze& eqGi1ibriara point  i c  def:r.e& 
- ,- - >-"m 
r2 I f o r  each player,  I.-?-J:c:: ae:err;ir,es 
. th Theorems 3 as6 - show ;>at 
e x i s t s  f o r  each specif ied value of the  
T'ne monotone behzvior a t  t he  equilibrium poinz of t;ie payoff 
i 
A ... 
- -I- o; I s The inxerest lng case where each 
-. 
L d 2  
_ _ - _  e A L L ~ L A l x  - -mc-u-  
IC -L;X:-.?ar i n  the s t r a t eg ie s  is disc--issed 70 i l l u s t r a t e  this csndition. - 
3. .. game L7, 81 i s  a special  case of t h i s  bii"inear payo';' ?mction. 
- ,n ~ e c z i o n  4 we consicer a reasonable dynamtc model of the  r.-?erson concave 
gsx~. 
z-L;~::;J~ z z  c'r,~..sge hic E:.% striregy 50 as t o  obtain t h e  mxinum rate of change 
u- 2:s OT,.TT; payo?: furiction w i t 3  respect t o  a change i n  h i s  own strategy. 
s'Lo-,,~ t he t  t k e  system of & i f f e r e c t i d  equcfons  obta'ned i n  t h i s  way has t h e  
I-, i s  assumed t h a t  i f  the gaine i s  not a t  equilibrium each plhyer w i l l  
,_o . It i s  
e 
3-.-.^1"-q,r 2. uu,- - r  ,La: every solut ion szarziEg i n  3 renains  i n  3 (Zieorer. 7 ) .  The 
s:a';llit;r of t he  system i s  considered i n  Theorems 8 and 9. It i s  showA t h a t  
.-?zL concavity conditions suff ic ient  for uniqueness a r e  s a t i s f i e d  the  system 
of cXffereztia1 equations is globally asymytotically s t ab le  a 
s ta rz ing  a x  any feasible point  i n  the s t r a t egy  space 
Furthermore, 
R, the  system of 
E' & A  3=+rep-ial L e q a t i o n s  w i l l  always converge t o  the  unique equilibrium point  of 
--- .-. origlrial  n-person concave game. Thus the  dynamic model and the  concave 
-= 1 r 3  kave tke saxe unique e q c i l i b r i u  point .  ' 3 e  s t a b i l i t y  proof Gses t h e  
--=-"e MA.. of :ke norm of the  r igh t  hand s ide  of the  d i f f e r e n t i a l  eqcations as a 
- .  - : z ~ a o v  ?~zc;lo;? t o  show t h a t  t h e  corm approaches zero. 
Z1;'I'erent d~pLaxic model of a compexitive equi l ibr iun  representea by a system or' 
LA-.- 
The s t a b i l i t y  of a 
< .--=ereF--- ,,,,al e q a t i o n s  has previousiy been invest igated [13, 193. 
- 3 -  
- 
. .  . - . .  
s 
- .a ~ e c ; : o c  5 it i s  skown that t‘r,e urilqae equilibrium point  t o  tZe concive 
_8zLe czn ‘se Zo-zd coiqutat ional ly  5y using a gradient pethod su i tab le  f o r  a 
c o ~ c ~ v s  z e t h e m t i c a l  prograrmtng pro‘dem [ 17, 181. 
2 geceral lzat ion of the  w e l l  known re la t ionship  between the  two-person zero- 
SLX gzxe and l i nea r  programming [l5:. 
cxicave constrainec maximization problem i s  obtained f o r  t h e  case n = 1, so  
5 x - c  s - x h  a problem may be considered as a spec ia l  case of t he  n-person concave 
Tiis may be consldered as 
It should a l s o  be noted t h a t  the  general  
+“,e. r-  m 
;o k a m .  results. 30-dever, the resLts  of Sectlon 4, Lri par t i cu la r  Theorem 7, 
apyar t o  be xev even for  n = 1. 
Tor t ’ n l s  spec ia l  case of n = 1, the  r e s u l t s  of Sections 2 and 3 reduce 
3 
- 4 -  
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- i n  x o s t  garr.e theory papers conslCeration I s  l imi ted  t o  ;he case where ezch 
Tlajrer s s t ra tegy  x i s  resTr ic tec  t o  i: convex s e t  i n  h i s  o m  i 
% E, C E 
L 
- 5  - 
* .  ' . .  . _  , 
L "k! -_ 
- 4 - = 3  -,;plf L 2 . 7 -  LLAActIorA fo r  the 5- ?layer Seper,c?s 02 the  s w a t e g i e s  of a i>  
zte cxksr 2;ayers a s  wel l  as his G X ~  stra;eiy, ami i s  given by the  f c - c t l o n  
Q, (x) = Q- (x- 
cor,tir;;ous i n  x and-is  concave In x i for each f ixed  value of 
I *\ ... x,, ... x 1. It will be assmied t h a t  lor x E S,  Cp2 I {x) i s  
.A. n 1 l . 1  
... x ) .  (Xi A > - .xi--, - YXi& With tkis formulation an equilibrium point of the n 
r,-?e,-son coricave game i s  given b;i 8 point xo E: 3 such t h a t  
AT sas> a ?olnt no player can increase h i s  payoff by a u n i l a t e r a l  change i n  
k1s strategy. 
?he r e s u l t s  t o  follow make use of t he  filnction p(x,y) defined for  
(x,yj  E FC x 3 by 
n 
7'- , ,L n ~ - ~ - ~ 7 r ~  " U u r . .  . z'r.aT, for (x,y) E R x 3 we nave (x?,. & . .yi,. . .x n ) E S, i =I,. . .n, 
sc --c*- L-aau ,p(x,y) IS continuous i n  x and y and i s  concave i n  y f o r  every 
f i x e 5  x, f o r  (x,y) E R x R .  We now prove the  existence theorem for t h e  
Theorerr, 1 
An equilibrium point e x i s t s  for every concave n-person - game. -- 
?roof: 
Conslder the point t o  s e t  napping x E R + I7 XC R, given by 
- 6 -  




~0:s; of t h e  convex, c~r;pact  s e t  R i n t o  h closed convex subset GI' 3.  Then 






... - 3 s  ?xe5 goint  xo  i s  an eqxA.m:ux poist. s a t i s fy ing  (2 .1) .  hor s u p p s e  t h a t  
- _ _  iL- vs re  not. %en, say f o r  1 = 1, there  wouid be a p03.r: x = x ~ such t h a t  
a * .  - - 
x = (xo ,  . . .x . . .xo)  n E ii and g2(x; > q 2 ( x 0 ) .  3ut  then we 'nave 1 1'' - 
p(x",x) > p(xo ,xo)  which contraoicts (2.4) 
- 7  - 
* 3.  L n i q x c s s s  of Squili-arlurn  psi:^;. 
- ,c o;-&r t o  dlscuss the  uniquexss  of an equilibrium point we xst 
.- &scr:se -,‘ne comex set  R more exp l i c i t l y .  For the  general  cou;3led COT;- 
szralz;t s e t  where R r  S ,  we w i l l  describe R by means of the  mappLng 
k ( x )  
iso~,cas~z f w x t i o n  of x. It is  assuxed t 5 a t  
k of Xm +E , where each component h j (x ) ,  j = 1,. . .k of h(x)  i s  a 
R =  (3.1) 
; s  ~ ~ ~ v o k ?  acd bo-mded. It follows from t h e  concavity of the  k;,(x) t h a t  
tk c;oseE s e t  3 is convex. Yor :he orzhogonal constraint  set  
3 = S = 3, x R2...x Ii, 
u 
we consieer t h e  nowoid and boucded s e t s  
i 
vkzre eack conqonent h . , (x i ) ,  j = l , o o q k  i’ i s  a concave functior, of x i’ 
so -,::at 2, is a Convex, ciosed and bmc2eCi set  i n  2 . We w i l l  Z ~ S O  
~ s s - ~ - . e  -,he s e t  3 costaics  s ? iu i I i t  -*-i;ick 2 ,  stric-t . ly i n t e r l o r  to 
every nonllcear constraint, t h a t  i s ,  3 x E 3, such t h a t  h . (x)  > G  or 
every xosiilzear cons t ra in t  h .(x). 
sa t i s5ac t lon  of t he  Kuhn-Tucker constraint  qua l i f ica t ion  [ 2 3 .  





This i s  a su f f i c i en t  condition :or the  
J 9 
We wish t o  use the  different ia ;  forin of t he  necessary and saf3 .c ien t  
Xihx-Txcker conditions for  a constrained raximm [ 6 3 .  
t h e  hddltlonal assumption that :ke h , ( x )  possess continuous f i r s t  deriva- 
~ l v e s  fo r  x E R .  We a l s o  assuze Ghat f o r  x E R the payoff I’unction 
We therefore  make 
d 
L 
. t h  ?,(:.-) ;‘or the 1- player possesses continuous first der ivat ives  with 
J. 
res2ect ‘io :he components of x, . For any sca la r  function Cp(x) we denote 
m‘ui by v . c ) ( x )  1 t h e  gradient .with respect  t o  xi .of q ( x ) .  Thus viCp(x) E L . 
- 8  - 
.- I -  : 
I- - 
I c- 
-7- AA4e X-ic.c-*Y-.xkzr conditiocs eqiiiva1er.t to (2.1) with 3 given 3;: (3.1) 
can .;OTJ be s t a t ed  as follows: 
h ( x o )  - > 0 
and :or I = l J . . . n , 3  uo > 0, - i io  E xk, such tinat 
i -  
u:'h(x") = o 
( 3 . 3 )  
(3 .5)  0' $I. ( X O )  - > Cpi(Xi,  .>'., A. ,* 0 axz) .f u"/h(x;, 1 . . .yi,. . .xO' n' 1 
Sizce cq2 (x) and h j ( x )  z r e  concave and d i f fe ren t iab le ,  




v;ci(xo) i z ~ , ~ i ~ j ( x o )  = 0, i = 1, ... n 
j= l  c-. 
c 
Ne w i l l  a l s o  use the  followlzg reiazion vnich holds as a r e s u l t  of the 
c o x z v i t y  01' h j ( x ) .  For every xo,  x '  E 3 we have 
n 
i=l 
h . ( x ' )  - h . ( x o )  < ( x 1 - x 0 f ~ h . ( x o )  = (xi-xi)'Q.h.(xo) (3.7) 
1 J  J J J > -  
A weighted nonnegative sum of t he  f'unctions rp.(x) 1 i s  given by 
i i  
u(>:,r) = 1 riqi(x), r i -  > o 
i=l 
(3 .8)  
n I'or each nocnegative vector r E E . For each f ixed r,  a r e l a t e d  inapping 
, (x ,yj  of Em i n t o  i t s e l f  i s  defined i n  terms of the gradients v,.~. (x)  by 1.1 
- 9  - 
. -  . .  . ,  
(3.9) 
AE Imporxar;t property of  U ( X , T )  i s  given by t h e  following 
7 S i M ' L '  L?- - L L l  u ,GS 
T ~ S  funct:or, u (x , r )  w i l l  be ca l led  diagonally s t r i c t l y  concave for 
x E 3 snci Tixed r 2 0, i f  for every x o ,  x' E R we have 
A s  shorn later,  a sufficient condltion t h a t  u(x , r )  be alagonally 
s z r l c t l y  concave i s  t h a t  t h e  s p z e t r i c  ratrix [G(x,r) + G.(x,r)] i s  
-=legative Eefini te  f o r  x E 3, wkere G(x,r) i s  t h e  Jacobian with respec t  t o  
x of g ( x , r ) *  
Y 
22 
'de f i r s t  give the  -miq.ileness theorem for orthogonal constraint  s e t s  
c.j &..eOr?Tn 2 - 
L _  - i; u(x , r )  2 diagonally s t r i c t l y  concave for some r = ' r  > 0, then the 
ec-LiilYDrium point  xo sat isfying (2.1) - i s  unique. 
Ir oof : 
Assmie there  a re  two d i s t i n c t  equilibrium points  xo and x '  E R ,  each 
05 wk:~? satisfies (2 .1) .  Then by t'le necessi ty  of t he  Kuhn-Tucker conditior-s 
2 h, (Xi) L 0 (3.11) 
& 
] u a  > 0,  ua E E i, such t h a t  i i -  
- 10 - 
a uf':?, (x,)  = 0 
k. 
for 4 = o and by Fi(x;-xi)l for = 1, I '  \:e mLtip1y (3.13) by ri(xi-xi) 
2nd SLX on i.. This gives 




Fa.,. -.+e ineqdai i ty  follows from the  concavity of the  hij(x) 
l a s t  r e l e t i o n  from (3.12). 
c(x,?) 
3uz t h i s  contradicts  (3.14), s o  t h a t  we cannot have t w o  d i s t i n c t  equilibrium 
p o i ~ ; s  z i e  t'zerefore xo i s  ur-ique. 
and ( 3 . 7 ) ,  and the  
Then from (3.11) we have t h a t  Y > 0. Since 
t h a t  f3 > 0. 
- 
i s  Giagonally s t r i c t l y  concave it follows from (3.10) 
We caw consider the general  case where R is a coupled cons t ra in t  set and 
i s  g;iver, -97 (3.1). 
givm by the  Kuhn-Tucker conditions a t  an equilibrium point  w i l l ,  in gzneral, 
The values 09 the nonnegztive mul t ip l ie rs  uf, i= 1, . . .n 
- 11 .- 
c 
- n - 
p(x,y,r)  = ricPi(xi,'"'Yi"'"X n 1 (3.18) 
- _  
b,s'Lng t h e  f ixed point theorem a s  i a  Theorem 1, there-xists a point xo such 2# 
J 
,,,en by t h e  necessi ty  of t& K?chn-Tucker conditions, h(x") > 0, and 3 u o  > 0, ---7-w 
such t h a t -  uo'h(xo) = 0 and 
- 1 2 -  
. 
.- 
1s i convex sTubseT of the posi t ive orthant of 3**. ?hen f o r  each r E Q -,here 
- -  i s  z 7;niq-w :-srmlized equilibrium point.  
?roof: 
--- _. - -  --
ASS.LZS zkat  f o r  some r = r E Q we have two normalized equilibrium 
7 s l n t s  xo an6 x'. Tnen we have Tor L? = 0, 1 and i = 1,. ..n, 
4 z (x  ) > 0 - 
L ,k 3 ua > C ,  -: E 2 , such t h a t  - 
n 
(3.21) 
/ -&T= ,.-7 r.iL-ibi~ly L (3 .23)  by (xj-x;) for = 0 and by (xf-xi) f o r  Z = 1, and 
A 
SXT. on i. A s  i n  t'ze proof of Theorem 2 t h i s  gives p + 5 = 0, where p i s  
g5ve;z by (3.15) and 
> - u" ' [h(x t ) -h(xo)]  + u" [ h ( x o ) - h ( x ' ) ]  
= G"'h(x') + u"I=1(:c0) - > 0 
(3.24) 
il: - .~ A.Ae-. since u(x,T) i s  diagonally s t r i c t l y  concave we have l3 > 0, whici; 
cx-zra2lc;s 9 T 8 = 0 and proves t h e  tteorem. 
. T i  we ~1111 now invest igate  t h e  dependezce of t h e  norral ized eq-diE7x:m, 2oirit 
c" TA? vake of r fo r  the  general  esse w'?,ere R i s  a cou2led constrain; s e t .  
j o r  zx ort'riogonal constraint  set it f o ~ o w s  f r o x  Tieorern 2 t h a t  iI' D(X,T) 
~ a g o z 2 l l ; r  s t r i c t l y  concave fo r  some 
2Lep3~32rn of r. 
exaxsie wizh a coupled constraint  set  (see Fig. 2) 
-n i s  
- - .  r = r > 0, t h e  equilibrium point  x" i s  
On the other hand it i s  not  d i f f i c u l t  t o  construct a simple 
where t h e  equiilbrium point  
xo iioes &?end on 
R 
r .  
(2 (.) = -.A x2  4- x x 
2 1 1 2  1 
2 
2 1 2  Q 2 ( X >  = - x  - x x 
hl(x) = x 1-  > 0 
-? (x) = x > 0 "2 2 -  
3 
Figure 2 
Is such a case we w i l l  now show tha t  i n  a ce r t a in  sense t h e  equilibrium value 
of vi 
n-.-sn-ce+T __._ v- 5 
I s  a monotone increasing 
Let o-(x,r) be - diagonaiiy 
function of ri0 
s;rictly concave for r E Q. L e t  r", r '  E Q -
- .  . .  . .  
. 
- .  Set  U0 2sd be the . yAieTs corresponding t o  the ncrrGllzed 
equiLibr2-z; points xo and Y. _,,en f o r  2 = 1. ar.' i = 1,. . a a : ; J  ana f o r  
2 = 0 azd i # q, the  re lat lo . . -  (3.2i1, (3.22) and (3.23) a re  sa;isfied 
Ti, 
A I 
K '-r')Vcp (x') + r z g y  (xo) + u:vh(xo) 5 9  = 0 (3.25) 
(rcI 9 9 9 9 9 9  j=1 
o r  since r' > ro  
9 q' 
--- 
32; ---: -..A s 1 s  . :-at t he  a i r ec t lona l  Zerivatlve of yq(xo) along t he  rcy 
(x' -xO). 
c _ q  
X use%l in te rpre ta t ion  of ?heoren 5 is obtained by observing t h a t  if 
* ,..ea -n 
Since xo i s  an equi l ibr iui i  point  x carriot be a 
vh;l;e or' p,(x) may decrease as x goes from t he  
it ;'allows from (3.27) tha; C? (x) > vq(xo), 
c, - 
A. 
- . . .x;, . . .xi) . where x = (x', 1 
f eas ib l e  poin2, and the 
infeas ib le  point  x t o  
- 
I %he zew {feas ib le )  equilibrium po<r,t x , as i l l u s t r a t e d  i n  Fig. 3. Because 
of :?.? diagonal coscavity proper ty  o f  
x 
Q_. A (x j  , t he  dependence of yq(x)  on 
Thereforz:, it w i l l  ..*.lli usual ly  dozinate i t s  5:- -.;Lence G:? x i' i # q. e 
and 
X g .  2, where it i s  easy to show that both 
- 1 5  - 
by the  exsq$-e of 
are.nonnegative.  
1 X 
F i g w e  3 
Je corrplete t h i s  seczion by giving a su f f i c i en t  condiition on zhe ?mctions 
?- (x), which insures  t h a t  u(x,r)  i s  diagonally s t r i c t l y  concave, The 
i 
given i n  terms of the  ratr ix  which i s  the Jacobian 
0;’ g(x,rj for f ixed r > 0 .  ‘~“nat i s ,  t h e  jth c o l m  of G(x,r) i s  
Let xo, x’  be any two d l s t i n c t  points  i n  R, and l e t  x(Gj = 8x‘ f (1-@;x 
so  t h a t  x (Q)  E R f o r  0 < - -  0 < 1. Xow since G(x,r) i s  the  Jacoblan of g (x , r )  
we have 
. .  
:CLt5ply:~g both s i aes  by (xo -XI)' gives 
/ - 1 - 
(x0 -x1)  g(x1,r)  +- (xl-xo) 'g(xo,F) = - Jo (xl-xo)'G(x(0),r)(xl-xo) d 6 
1 1  - 
- - -  i, ( x * - x " ) ' [ ~ ( x ( e ) , F )  + G'(x(e),r)]  (x1-x0)  a e > o (3.30) 2 
-3- - ,w..~cl: shows ;;?at (3.10) i s  sa t i s f le i i .  
n: . -.E ;zteres;<rg case where Q. (x) i s  j i l i n e a r  i n  the strzte2:es x 
1 3 
e:z?'r.aslzes an iz?ortant r e l a t i o n  between this condition and a s t a b i l i t y  matrix. 
:?e ;et -I 
n 




J i s  an  m . X m .  coc;- int  T.72 ? r e i s  a cocstant vector i n  E 
and ' i j  1 J  e: ., 
. - - - ~ - - ~  
n',. ,, e b l x z t r i x  g a x  [7,8]  i s  a spec ia l  case of'- (3.31) with 
- 
L, e .  = 0, CL1 = CZ2 - 0 a 5  + C, c~~ + C. ~ i l e  two-person zero-sux r -  - 
1; 
;&-e is a fur ther  spec ia l iza t ion  w i t h  C, 





and G(x,r) as i t s  Jacobian matrix, 
G(x,r) = D C 
C =  2c22 
2cm 
( 3 . 3 2 )  
(3.33) 
- . 
a:?& D i s  ;he diagonal posl t ive def in i te  m t r i x  9 = Liag{ri]-  For t ’ n l s  
b:;kear case it follows from Yneorems 2 and 6 t h a t  we have u n i p e c e s s  if 
-,‘fiere e x i s t s  some r > 0 such t h a t  
- 
- - 
wkerz 3 = Ciag. {ri ]. But t h i s  i s  j u s t  the condition which ensures t h a t  
A 
every elgerxai-iie 0;’ 
3’ - -cV. m; Li4ils t he  szxe condltion whlch gdarantees uniqueness a l so  
C has a negative Teal p a r t  (see,  for exanple, 
A L 6 ~ A L  3 1). 
< ,--?- ,,.,~,ies daz C i s  a s t a b i l i t y  mt r ix .  
A case which rriight 3e corisldered as a general izat ion of t he  ,vo-person 
z e r o - s a  gane i s  the  n-person “skew-symnetric” game where 
c,, = - c:, i, j = 1, ... n. For such a game we w i l l  have [C + C’] negative 





. .  1 . _  
I 
. .  - r r -  A - - c ~  zac;: ?:eyer c;?e-ges h l s  oh;:- st rategy i n  such a way t h a t  t he  :olr,t strategy 
L 
-.-em.- ,.rdiris _. In  3 ami his owx payoff fmc t ion  would increase i f  a l l  other players  
he16 to t h e 2  cdrrent s t ra tegy.  That i s ,  each player changes hi-s st:-ategy a t  
a r a t e  proportional t o  t he  gradient wlth respect t o  h i s  s t ra tegy  of h i s  payoff 
? c x t l o n ,  Subject t o  the  constraints .  If w e  l e t  the proportionali%y constant 
T c r  <:?e i- Player be ri, w e  obtain tSe following system of dif 'erentlal  
e;-z.tlor,s ?cr t h e  s t r a t eg ie s  x,, 
. tki 
A 
- -  - 2 = r i v i q i ( x )  t 1 c 4 v . h . ( x )  , i = 1, ... n ( k . 1 )  
C i t  i ;=1 J I J  
vhere the  veczor u i i e s  i n  a bouzded su-met U(x) of t he  pos i t ive  or thant  of 
2 . ,ne e f f e c t  of the s u m i t i o n  term, with the appropriate choice of u, i s  -k n- 
- 
,:+ ~ S C - L ,  t k e  r i g h t  hand s ide of (4.1) i s  Sus t  t he  project ion of t'rie gradient 
y -- '*,) ,/:q2 OL :'ne xzr,lfold forned 3y the aczive cons t ra in ts  a t  x. If we def ine - 
arid ~ s e  t h e  def in i t ion  (3 .9)  of g ( x , r ) ,  w e  can define the  mapping f (x ,u , r )  
of Y 
- 
f o r  each f ixed r > 0, as follows n+ k --3. E" 
- - 
f ( x , u , r )  = g(x,r) i E ( X ) U  
?ken :he sys-Lern (4.1) can be wri t ten 
2 = f (x ,u,F)  , u ' Yix) 




. .  . .  
y2e set i s  6eterznine6 as  fo l lows  
I '  .v.>O, j E J 
v .=O, j  #J 
J- 
J 
J = J(x) = ( j l h j ( x )  5 0) (4.6) 
-- ~ a t e  that f o r  every i z t e r i o r  polnt x of ii L-.e s e t  J (x)  i s  e q t y  and 
~dke-re S T ? ,  I s  a conpact set  such thar, every point of the  compact s e t  2 i s  
3 - p  6 02 : * -  
%cause of t h e  cont i rd i ty  i n  x, an& assming  only t h a t  u i s  r?easul-able ~ 
i n  5 ,  we have from the  Carathgodory existence theory [14,16] t h a t  a conticuo-Ls 
I 
soluition x ( t )  e x i s t s  foF x ( t )  i n  R, which s a t i s f i e s  (4.4) a lnos t  ever~pkerer 
Xow sup?ose t h a t  fo r  some point X ' E  fl on t h e  t r a j ec to ry  x ( t )  we have 





on -,he t r a i ec to ry ,  such t h a t  h.(;) I ,  = 0 an& $,(x) < 0. But froz the  l a t t e r  
I azC ( k . 4 )  we have 
- 2 0 - -  
or 
- I I  Accsr6.lng t o  (4.9) we could decrease the norm i i f i l  by increasing u 1 > 0. Eut 
- 
I _  
50 u”-- .-G” ;1 4 U ( x ) .  Ynis ContreClction sko-ds t h a t  there  i s  no poin-c x’  
or- t k e  t razec tory  such t h a t  h i (x’) < 0, f o r  zny i, which proves the  theorex. 
I sy a ki rec t  appl lcat ion of ,he necessi ty  of the Xuhn-?”ucker conZ.tions for 
t k e  cosstrzined mini::lzation proklem i n  (4.5) it i s  not  d i f f i c u l t  t o  demonstrate 
(4.10) 
-- 
- - - r;, 0 -_I..- n x k  imtrix Ii = E(x) 
E(X) selected - f rom v h i ( x )  J - for j E J. 
Ve now consider an equilibrium point 
consis ts  of k l i z s a r l y  independent columns - of 
- 
x of the  system of d i f f e r e n t i a l  
- - e q  ~ l o n s  (4.4). That is, for a fixed r = r, we w i l l  c a l l  x an equi l ibr iua  
p:nt of (4.4) i f  
- -  
f ( x , u , r )  = 0,  u E u(X) (4.11) 
- 21 - 
, 
8-8; syisue;r. (+.-;) I I  1 w i l l  be ca l led  Esyxptozically s t ab le  i n  R i f  for every 
- ALA-.w:al . ~ .  _ _  ?Dint x E R, t he  solu;ion x(~) t o  (4*4) converges t o  a-n equil;brii,z 
___c 
. .  
b 
J i s  negative d e f i n i t e  f o r  x E 3, If 2 i s  given by (3.1) an6 [G + G'- ---- ---
- I \ . - ~ + . C  --- - G i s  the  Jacobian, of g(x,F), then the  systerr, (:. . k )  i s  a s -  L O -  -- -- - -- 
sta-2;e I- 3. 
- -  2 .-ooT: 
_. 
- corisider the s i t m z i o n  wken the  se l ec t io s  of columns i n  H(x) r e m l n s  uchange6.. 
- n- iaec s ince a l l  elemects of u a r e  zero except those given by u > 0, we have 
- 
f rox  (4.3) 
(4.12) 
wkers Q i s  the Jacobian of v'.(x) (or i t s  equivalent,  t he  Hessian of h i ( x ) )  
ai& I s  therefore  negativi. s emide fh i t e  from t'ne concavity of 
(4*;3) ami (4.4) we have 
J -* J d 
h { s:) . Now using 
j 
I .  . . .  , 
(4.16) 
f o r  scze E > 0. 
? n  I,, 3 if f o r  every s t a r t i n g  poir?t x E R the solut ion x(t) t o  (4.4) converges 
t o  xo. We w i l l  now show that with the appropriate concavity conditlons the 
L-G-L~  eycill>rium point xo 01" (2.1) 1 s  also globally asymptoticall-y s t ab le  i n  
- 
?:::e2 r = r > 0. Tken If [G -I- G ' ]  - i s  ceg;ative de f in i t e  - for x E T, - t he  -- 
Slnce [G + G'] i s  negative def'inite, u(x,?) i s  diagonally s t r ic t> /  
c a ~ c a v e  by Theoren 6. Ynen by "heorem 4 there  i s  a unique normalizsi e q 1 ~ i l i 3 r i u ~  
- 
77-2 J v A A - u  .,. x0 = x o ( r > ,  which sa t i sZles  (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23). BL tz equ:libr:Lz? 
- 
pein; x of (4 .4)  a l s o  s a t i s f i e s  these three r e l a t ions .  The f i r s t  relation i s  
satis:ieE slnce x E 3 ,  
zkr,ere:cre we xast have x = xo. R-J I;neorern 8, the  system (4.4) IS a s p p t -  i c a l l y  
- 
while (4-11) i s  ecJivalent t o  (3.223 and ( 3 . 2 3 ) .  
- 
- 23 - 
. : ... . 
. - - -  . c;z;,e iz F.. S l cce  x = xo is u i q u e  -,he soi-dtior, to (4.4) w i l l  converge zo 
--o 3 c r .  e-rery sza r t l ng  po ix t  Ir, 3 ,  a ~ d  tine systen: I s  globally a s p p t o t i c a l l y  
..- 24 - 
?a;:on of 3qui l ibr iuT Point. 
7' -'-ye ,;cSal s t a b i l i t y  of t h e  equi l lbr iua  point permits us t o  determine 
- c -  AC x i q u e  eqililibrium point  for  any concave game 3y a p p o p r i a t e  mathemtical  
yGg?arxiing conputational methods. 
cczczve nonlinear programming problem 
eq;2l:-Drim ?oint for a concave game. 
e: - m 3 c - -  
cczs;rzlrAts Sy project ion,  or appropriate psna l t ies ,  i n  order t o  r e r a i n  i n  the 
I's-ea:~-e reglor,  3 .  
,..c,:.v~s t o  tkz concave gaxe problem is t o  m e  the vector 
( 3 . 9 > ,  as I f  it were the  gradient of a function of 
Lo cz x a x h i z e c  for x E €3. 
gIve a. point 
a r e  s t i t isf ie&.  
+:&Ab f o r  t h e  concave gaxe. 
-AS g:a&:mt g(x , r>  
_.-.e graciect project ion method cec 'ce considere2 as a f i n i t e  difi'erznce 
853"- L L  vxiI?ztloa _-  t o  the  system (4.:  ) I wiere ;:?e solut ion i s  obtainee 5y a seqzence 
oI' f i a i t e  s;eps i n  the directior- oI" ;he ---.--- "iLcted gradient 
oniy p a c t i c a l  difference betweer- this ard a t rue  maximization prc3iem i s  t h a t  
iz the l a t t e r  case we choose the  ste? length s o  a s  t o  give a maxizom of t h e  
t r u e  Fdnctlon value along the  chosen ray, whereas for the  e q u i l i b r i m  point  
??a-alem ve choose the  s t e p  length s o  a s  t o  minimize the  norm of 
In pa r t i cu la r ,  gradient methods f o r  Yne 
[17',L8] can be modified t o  f i n d  the  
Such methods take f i n i t e  s teps  i n  t he  
L o n  of the gradient of the  function t o  be mxirnized taking account of the 
.-  - Yne e s s e n t i a l  ldea i n  applying one of these grec iec t  
,~ -- ,- r.? - g:(x,r) ,  given by 
x, where the  f m c t i o n  i s  
The solation t o  t h i s  "maximization" pro3lem w i l l  I -  
xo E R where the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (3.21), (3.22) and (3.23) 
3'2t as has been shown suck; a point  i s  the  unique equilibrium 
yn- -- Wote thet  t be  optirrali ty 4 conditions involve only 
,I 
and do not reqLire t3at the  function i t s e l f  be known. 
w 




f .  
To s k m  ';?OW t h i s  i s  done we consider t he  f i n i t e  Cifference a??roxiration 
-,-. 
i.- (+.4) given 3y 
x jtl = xj t T j  f (xj ,uj ,F)  , u j  E u(xj)  
wkere T' i s  the  s tep  length t o  be selected.  
b 
. . .  . -  
c 
w'nlch glves 
(5 .3 )  
(5.4) 
(5.5) 
j+ l  j+ l  j + i  - F i c r l l y  slnce f J + l  = f ( x  ,u ,r), where u E U(x'+'), it follows 
~ G E  (4.5) ana (5.2) t h a t  j)f''*'' < < /]fjll. 
I .  , I  - 
The convergence of t h i s  I"lr,',te dl3-erence procedure t o  -the ur-ique 








7 .  
3 .  
9. 
10. 
? l  LA. 
~ 12. 
, "Non-cooperatfve g z x s " ,  Annals of iYiath. 54, (1951) , pp. 286- -
295 
- 27 - 
_- 
- y e  szavz, L. , Tfie s t a b i l i t y  of dynamic processes" , ~cocoxletr ica  -> 29 (1961) , - ?  
22. 617-630. 
- 28 - 
